RESTRAINING THE COLLECTION OF FEDERAL
TAXES AND PENALTIES BY INJUNCTION.
Section 3187 of the Revised Statutes of the United States1
provides that if any person liable to pay any taxes neglects or
refuses to pay the same within ten days after notice and demand,
it shall be lawful for the collector or his deputy to collect the
said taxes, with 5 per centum additional thereto, and interest, by
distraint and sale of the goods, chattels, or effects of the person
delinquent.
Just what circumstances will warrant a court of equity in
interfering with the collection of a tax is a question upon which
there is a diversity of opinion. It is well recognized that in any
event before an injunction will be granted restraining the collection of a fax the taxpayer must show that his case falls within
2
one of the recognized branches of equity jurisdiction.
With respect to taxes levied under the authority of the
federal government, Section 3224 of the Revised Statutes 3 provides that:
"No suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or
collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court."

Legislative History of Section

3224 R. S. The Internal
Revenue Act of July 13, 1866, 4 provided, as follows:
"No suit shall be maintained in any court for the recovery
of any taxes alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, until appeal shall have been duly made to
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, according to the provisions of law in that regard, and the regulations of the Secretary
of the Treasury, established in pursuance thereof, and a decision
of said Commissioner shall be had thereon, unless such suit shall
be brought within six months from the time of said decision, or
within six months from the time this Act takes effect: Provided,
That if said decision shall be delayed more than six months from
the date of such appeal, then said suit may be brought at any
time within twelve months from the date of such appeal."

'Comp. Stat. (1913),

Sec.

5909, 3 Fed. Stat. Ann. (2d ed.), io4.

Shelton v. Platt, x39 U. S. 591 (1891).

'Comp. Stat. (913), Sec. 5947, 3 Fed. Stat. Ann. (2d ed.), ro32.
' 14 Stat. L ip, Sec. 19.
(318)
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By Section io of the Act of March 2, 1867, 5 it was enacted
that Section 19 of the Act of i866 be amended by adding the
following thereto:
"And no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment
or collection of tax shall be maintained in any court."
In the Revised Statutes of the United States, this amendment of an addition to Section i9 of the Act of i866 is made
a section by itself (Section 3224), separated from that of which
it is an amendment and to which it is an addition, and in the
Revised Statutes it reads as follows:
"No suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or
collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court."
The word "any" was inserted by the revisers.
Mr. Justice Blatchford, in Snyder v. Marks,6 after considering the foregoing legislative history of this section, said:
"This enactment in Section 3224 has no more restricted the
meaning than it had when, after the Act of x867, it formed a
part of Section i§ of the Act of 1866, by being added thereto.
The first part of Section 19 related to a suit to recover back
money paid for a tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed or collected, and the Section, after thus providing for the
circumstances under which such a suit might be brought, proceeded, when amended to say, that 'No suit for the purpose of
restraining the assessment or collection of tax shall be maintained in any court.' The addition of 1867 was in pari materia
with the previous part of the Section and related to the same
subject-matter. The tax spoken of in the first part of the Section was called a tax sub modo, but was characterized as a 'tax
alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected.'
Hence, when, on the addition to the Section, a tax was spoken of,
it meant that which is in a condition to be collected as a tax, and
is claimed by the proper public officers to be a tax, although on
the other side it is alleged to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed."
' r4 Stat. L 475.

' (1883) 109 U. S. 189, 27 Law. Ed. 901, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 157.
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Before any taxpayer can resort to a court of equity and
restrain the collection of a federal tax by injunction, it must
be shown that the suit is not prohib.ted by this section of the
Revised Statutes, which was held to be constitutional in Pzdlan
v. Kinsinger.7
APPLICATION OF STATUTE.

This section applies to taxes levied by the United States
only 8 but does not apply to taxes levied by the District of Columbia, although such taxes are levied under authority of the United
States. 9 Even though the application of the statute is limited
to taxes levied by the United States, it is said that it shows the
sense of Congress of the evils to be feared if courts of justice
could, in any case, interfere with the process of collecting the
taxes on which the government depends for its continued existence.10
While the statute appears to be so drawn as to prohibit injunctions being issued in any case, it has been found that its
provisions are suificiently general as to raise a doubt as to their
proper application in some cases, and in the case of Dodge
Bros. v. Osborn,"1 Chief Justice White intimated that an injunction might be secured in exceptional cases. At page 122,
the Chief Justice said:
. . .it is obvious that the statute plainly forbids the
enjoining of a tax unless by some extraordinary and entirely
exceptional circumstances its provisions are not applicable,"
In Kissingerv. Bean 12 the Court said:
"In other words, I should not be prepared to hold that if
the commissioner were to determine that a person not a distiller
and not interested in the business of distilling was subject to
'(C. C., S. D., Ohio, 1870) 2 Abb. 94, 2o Fed. Cas. No. 11,463.
'State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575 (1875).
*Alexandria Canal R. etc. Co. v. District of Columbia, z Mackey (D. C.)
234 0880.
' State Railroad Tax Cases, supra in Note &
24o U. S. xr8 i916).
(C. C,
1) , Wis, 1875) 7 Bliss 6% 14 Fed. C.

No. 7%.:
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assessment as a distiller, that he was then within his jurisdiction,
and that a court of equity could not, because of the prohibition
in section 3224, intervene."
It is, therefore, the purpose of this article to show in what
cases injunctions have been granted 'to restrain the collection of
federal taxes and penalties, and, likewise, the cases in which
the courts have refused to grant such injunctions.
Having respect for that sound instinct of the legal profession which distrusts any statement of what is the law unless
such statement is based on a careful study of the decided cases,
this article is confined to a statement of the law as announced
in the recorded decisions of the courts. In other words, it i
an exposition of the existing law, -no attempt being made to
show what the law should be. Since no state court can, by
injunction or otherwise, prevent federal officers from collecting
federal taxes,13 the field of -nvestigation has been narrowed to
since March 2, 1867,
decisions of federal courts exclusively,
14
when this section was first enacted.
Taxing Acts. The provisions of this statute have been
applied to income taxes levied under the Act of July I, 1862
(12 Stat. L. 432),'- to taxes levied under the Corporation Tax
Act of August 5, 1909 (36 Stat. L. 112),"6. to the income and
surtaxes levied under the Act of October 3, 1913 (38 Stat. L.
166) ;17 to stamp taxes levied under section 22 of the War
Revenue Act of October 22, 1914 (38 Stat. L. 758),8 to taxes
levied under the Child Labor Tax Law (40 Stat. L. 1057, 1138,
"Keely v. Sanders, 99 U. S. 441 (879).
1T14

Stat. 1. 475.

'Magee

8943.

v. .Denton, et at., (C. C., N. D., NL Y., 1863) 16 Fed. Cas. No.

"Straus v. Abrast Realty Co., (D. C., E. D., N. Y.,

1912)

2oo

Fed.

327.

" Dodge v. Brady,

24o U. S. 722 (116); Dodge v. Osborn, 24o U. S.
v.
Graham, (C. C. A., Third Cir., 1923) 284 Fed. io7,
1x8 (xgi6); Du Pont
affirming 283 Fed. 300.
"Kobhlammer v. Smietanka, (D. C., N. D., Ill., E. D., x917) 239 Fed.
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Ch. i8) ;19 to estate .taxes levied under Title VI. of the Revenue
Act of 1918 (4o Stat. L io96).20
The statute has been held to be inapplicable to the assessments levied under Title II., Section 35 of the National Prohibition Act (4 Stat. L. 305).21 There are, however, some
decisions to the contrary. 22 These cases will be discussed later.
Some cases have held it applicable to the taxes levied under this
Act, but not applicable as to the penalties imposed by the Act,
and refused to issue the iijunction as to the penalties until the
2
taxes were paid. a
Because of the exceptional and extraordinary circumstances
with respect to the operation of the Future Trading Act of
August 24, 192 1,24 the Supreme Court refused to apply the
provisions of Section 3224 R. S., to the taxes levied under that
Act.2
In General.-Individual Taxpayers. -While one court has
held that Section 3224 R. S. applies to all suits to'restrain the
collection of taxes,2 6 it appears that this is further than most
courts will go in its application. It is generally held that the
inhibition of this statute applies to all assessments and collections
of internal revenue taxes made or attempted to be made under
color of their offices, by internal revenue officers charged with
general jurisdiction over the assessment and collection of such
taxes. 2T In the case of Nichols v. Gaston, the court said:
"Bailey v. George, 259 U. S. x6 (i922).
" Nichols v. Gaston, (C. C. A., First Cir.,

1922)

281 Fed. 67; Page v.

Polk, (C. C. A., First Cir., 1922) 281 Fed. 74.
'Fontenot v. Accardo, (C. C. A., Fifth Cir., 1922) 278 Fed. 87!;
Kausch v. Moore, (D. C., E. D., Mo., E. D., i92o) 268 Fed. 668; Ledbetter
v. Bailey, (D. C., W. D., N. C., 1921) 274 Fed. 375; Middleton v. Mee,
(D. C., S. Dak., S. D., 1921) 277 Fed. 492; Thome v. Lynch, (D. C., Minn.,
Third Div., i92i) 269 Fed. 995; Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U. S. (1922);
Regal Drug Corp. v. Wardell, 26o U. S. (x922).
' Ketterer v. Lederer, (D. C., E. D., Pa., 192o) 269 Fed. z53; Pummilli
v. Riordan, (D. C., W. D., N. Y., 1921) 275 Fed. 846; Wassel v. Lederer,
(D. C., E. D., Pa., 1921) 274 Fed. 489.
'Kelly v: Lewellyn, (D. C., W. D., Pa., 1921) 274 Fed. xix
H42 Stdt. L 187.
"Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44 (1922).
"eMarkle v. Kirkendall, (D. C., M. D., Pa., i92o) 267 Fed. 498.
'Snyder v. Marks, 1o9 U. S. i89 (1883); Dodge v. Osborn, supra in
Nbte 17; Nichols v. Gaston, Jupra in Note 2o; Page v. Polk, (C. C. A.
First Cir. x922) 281 Fed. 74; Black v. Rafferty (D. C., E. D., N, Y., xg3),
not yet reported.
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that the inhibition of section
"It would seem
3224 applies to all assessments or collections of internal revenue
taxes made or attempted to be made under cover of office by
internal revenue officers charged with general jurisdiction over
the assessment and collection of -such taxes, and that, if the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in assessing a tax, or the
collector, in collecting it, acts under cover of his office, section
3224 applies, and that no suit to restrain the assessment or
collection of the tax can be maintained."
The cases of Nichols v. Gaston and Page v. Polk held that
a collector who is proceeding to collect by distraint an assessment
of federal estate taxes before the expiration of the time for
payment allowed by the statute is acting under color of authority.
In Kissinger v. Bean 28 the Court said:
"If the plaintiff is within a class of persons against whom
the commissioner may make assessments, though his proceedings
be ever so irregular and erroneous, the court cannot interfere."
This statement of the court has lately been approved in
2
Markle v. Kirkendal. 1
In addition to the reason underlying this section-that the
government shall not be delayed or interfered with in the collection of its revenues 3 -- it is held that Congress has established
a complete system of corrective justice and the only redress of
an aggrieved -taxpayer is to pay the taxes assessed and sue to
recover the taxes in the method provided for therein.3 1 It
is not until the taxes alleged to be due have been paid under
protest and the collector sued for the return of the amount
paid, with interest, that the legal remedy of the taxpayer is
exhausted.M
" (C. C., F. D., Wis. 1875) 7 Bliss 6o, 14 Fed. Ca. No. 78&.
"(D. C., M. D., Pa., 1920) 267 Fed. 498.
"Thome v. Lynch, (D. C., Minn., Third Div., i92i) 269 Fed. 995.
0Calkins v. Smietanka, (D. C., N. D., Ill., x917) 24o Fed. i38; Union
Fishermen's Co-operative Packing Company v. Huntley, (D. C., Oreg., I923)
285. Fed. 671.
"State Railroad Tax Cases, supra in Note 8; Bailey v. George, supra
in Note ig.

3
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By the provision. that no suit can be maintained for the
purpose of restraining either the assessment or the collection of
the tax, the statute has, in fact, provided that payment must be
made at all events, whether the tax was justly or unjustly levied,
and that redress for an unjust exaction must be sought subse33
quently.
The fact that the collector may be financially unable to
respond is no justification for the issuance of an injunction, as
the Government will assume his responsibility, 4 the claim, under
Section 989 of the Revised Statutes, then being one against the
United States.5
The prohibitions of Section 3224 R. S., cannot be waived by
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the collector of internal
revenue, or the district attorney."
In Snyder v. Marks,31 Mr. Justice Blatchford concluded
that there is no force in the suggestion that Section 3224 P. S.,
in speaking of a tax, means only a legal tax, and that an
illegal tax is not a tax, and so does not fall within the inhibition
of the statute, and the collection of it may be restrained. This
Section, therefore, prohibits the granting of injunctions to restrain illegal taxes as well as legal taxes.
In the case of Gouge v. Hart,'* a suit against a collector
to cancel a sale to the Government of a taxpayer's property to
satisfy a tax assessed against him, the question was raised
whether or not the word "restrain" as used in this section of
the Revised Statutes should be construed in a narrow sense as
prohibiting the issuance of restraining orders and injunctions, or
in a broad, liberal sense, as applying to all suits to hinder or
impede the collection of taxes. The court, in holding that the
'U. S. v. Black, (C. C., S. D., N. Y., 1874) ii Blatchf. 538 24 Fed.

Cas. No. i4,6oo.

"Cutting v. Gilbert, (C. C., S. D., N. Y., i865) 5 BlatchL 259, 6 Fed.
Cas. No. 3519.
' iock Produce Co. v. Hartson, (D. C., W. D., Wash., S. D., 1914) 212
Fed. 75&
"Gouge v. Hart, (D. C, W. D., Va., 1917) 250 Fed. 8=
" (1883) io9 U. S. 189, 27 Law. Ed. 9o, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. z$7.
1 (D. C., W. D., Va., 1917) 25o Fed. 8o?.
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collection of a tax can not be restrained indirectly by a suit to
have the sale of the taxpayer's property by the collector declared
void, adopted the broad definition, saying:
"If Section 3224 is considered as forbidding only injunc.
that. a
.
tion suits, we have, . . . the result
court which is forbidden to enjoin the doing of an illegal act,
may after such an act has been done, set it aside as a nullity.
"

29

The word "assessment," as used in this Section, can not
fairly be limited to the iniental act of an officer who determines
the amount, but it must include the preliminary investigation
as well as the final determination, for one is as important as
the other. 40 It has also been held that this Section prohibits a
suit for the purpose of restraining an assessment of a tax as
41
well as the collection of a tax.
The doctrine laid down by Mr. Justice Blatchford in Snyder
v. Marks4 2 has been repeatedly applied, until it is no longer
open to question that a suit may no longer be brought to enjoin
the assessment or collection of a tax because of the unconstitutionality of the statute imposing it,40 and the averment that
a federal taxing statute is unconstitutional will not take the
case out of the operation of the provisions of Section 3224
R. S.4 i There must be some extraordinary and exceptional
circumstances to render inapplicable the provisions of this Section of the Revised Statutes. 45 What then are the exceptional
and extraordinary circumstances that will prevent the application
of this Section to a suit for an injunction to restrain the assessment or collection of a federal tax?
"The Supreme Court of the United States dismissed the appeal for
want of jurisdiction. 251 U. S. 542.
OKohlhammer v. Smietanka, supra in Note X8.
0Miles v. Johnson, (C. C., Ky., 1893) 59 Fed. 38.
a i9 U. S. i89 (1883).
"Dodge v. Osborn, supra in Note 17.
"Dodge v. Osborn, and Dodge v. Brady,-supra in Note 17; Bailey v.

George, j.upra in Note 19.
Dodge v. Osborn, and Dodge v. Brady, jupra in Note 17; Bailey Y.
George, jupra in Note x9; Hill v. Wallace, supra in Note 2-.
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Frayser v. Russell 48 is often referred to as a case in which
a court of equity has granted an injunction restraining federal
officials in the collection of a tax since Section 3224 R. S. was
enacted in 1867. But an examination of that case discloses that
what the collector was asserting to be a tax was not a tax; that
the collector had attempted to assess the tax himself, whereas,
under Section 3371 R. S., '7 it was made the duty of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to make the assessment and certify the same to the collector. As the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue had not assessed the tax and certified it to the collector,
the latter had neither a tax to collect nor color of authority for
its collection. 48
In the case of Dodge v. Brady,4 a claim for abatement had
been filed with the collector alleging the tax sought to be collected
was illegal because of the unconstitutionality of the taxing statute. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue ruled on the claim
adversely, and in doing so passed upon the very question which
he would be called upon to decide on an appeal for the refunding of the tax, if paid. In that case, the court retained jurisdiction to pass upon the merits of the tax, even though the suit
w as one for an injunction to restrain the collection of a tax. In
so doing the court predicated its action on the fact that to follow
this course would be to put an end to further useless and unnecessary controversy. The court, at page 126, said:
is. . . broadly considering the whole situation, and taking into viev the peculiar facts of the case, the protest to the
Commissioner, and his exertion of authority -over it, and his
adverse ruling upon the merits of the tax, thereby passing upon
the very question which he would be called upon to decide on
an appeal for a refunding of the taxes paid, we think that this

case is so exceptional in character as not to justify us in holding
that reversible error was committed by the court below in passing upon the.case on its merits, thus putting an end to further
4 (C. C.,- E. D., Va., 1878) 3 Hughes 227

"Comp.

Stat. (1913)

9 Fed. Cas. No. 5o67.

Sec. 6M8o, 4 Fed. Stat. Ann. (2d ed.) 146.

" Nichols v. Gaston. supra in Note 2o.
"240 U. S. 122 (1916).
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absolutely useless and unnecessary controversy. We say useless
and unnecessary because on the merits all the contentions urged
by the applicants concerning the unconstitutionality of the law
and of the surtaxes which it imposes have been considered and
adversely disposed of in Brushaber z,. Union P. R. Co., 240 U.
S. i, 6o Law Ed. 493, 36 Sup. Ct, Rep. 236."
It may therefore be said that the court will retain jurisdiction and pass upon the merits of a supplemental bill to recover
the tax after payment, even though the originalbill was brought
to enjoin the collection. of the tax, alleging the taxing statute to
be unconstitutional, where it is clear that the taxpayer could not
recover even if the action were rightfully brought. 50
It has been held also that an injunction will be granted in a
case where the taxpayer, if forced to pay the tax by distraint,
would have no recourse at law due to the fact that the statutory
period allowed for the filing of a claim for refund, or bringing
suit against the collector, has expired. 5"
The District Court in its opinion in the Dit Pont case, which
was adopted by the Circuit Court of Appeals, said:
"While Section 3224 has been strictly construed in view of
the remedial system providing for remedies of the taxpayer
against the imposition of illegal taxes following Mr. Justice
Blatchford's comprehensive discussion of the subject in Snyder
vz Marks, iO9 U. S. i89, Congress has since added to the system the limitations contained in the Act of 1921 and reading
these new provisions in connection with Section 3224, I cannot
conceive that Congress intended the taxpayer to be rigidly held
to the inhibitions of Section 3224 if the effect should' be to
nullify the inhibitions against the officers of the revenue contained in the later statutes and thus to subject the taxpayer to
proceedings by distraint without leaving him an adequate remedy
at law, after the limitation had run against the collector's right
to begin such proceedings."
"*Dodge v. Brady, supra in Note 17.
'Du Pont v. Graham, (C. C. A., Third Cir, 1923) 284 Fed. 1017, affirming 283 Fed. 300. This case is now. before the Supreme Court of the
United States on a writ of certiorari granted February 26, 1923. 67 Law.
Ed. 417. It is to be noted that the situation existing in this case could no4
exist under Revenue Acts subsequent to tie Revenue Act of 1913.
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It has been suggested that if it can be shown in any case
that a suit against a collector to recover the tax paid and interest would not afford the taxpayer an adequate remedy, because
in order to pay the tax he would be compelled to dispose of his
property at a figure below its real worth, for which, of course,
the return of the tax and interest would not reimburse him, then
a court of equity in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction to
afford relief where a suitor has no adequate remedy at law,
would act by injunction to prevent the collection of a tax illegally assessed. 52
The Supreme Court of the United States in Hill v. Wallace, 58 a suit to restrain the collection of taxes assessed under
the Future Trading Act of 1921, 54 granted an injunction against
the Secretary of Agriculture on the ground that it would prevent a multiplicity of suits, which, under the circumstances of
this particular case would be impracticable. The court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Taft, said:
"It has been held by this court, in Dodge v. Brady, 240 U.
S. 122, 126, that Section 3224 of the Revised Statutes does not
prevent an injunction in a case apparently within its terms in
which some extraordinary and entirely exceptional circumstances make its provisions inapplicablfe. See also Dodge v. Osborn, o U. S. 1i8, 122. In the case before us, a sale of grain
for future delivery without paying the tax will subject one to
heavy criminal penalties. To pay the heavy tax on each of many
daily transactions which occur in the ordinary business of a
member of the exchange, and then sue to recover it back, would
necessitate a multiplicity of suits and, indeed, would be impracticable. For the Board of Trade to refuse to apply for designation as a contract market, in order to test the validity of the
act, would stop its i6oo members in a branch of their business
most important to themselves and to the country. We think
these exceptional and extraordinary circumstances with respect
to the operation of this act make Section 3224 inapplicable."
An injunction will be granted to restrain the collection of
the tax if it dearly appears that the action. of the collector is a
lHoutmery, Income Tax Procedure, (x9zM)

09S9 U. S. 44 (19=2).
"43 Star. L 187.

p. a6o,
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nullity, or that the property about to be seized is not liable for the
assessment. 55 However, Section 3224 has been held to apply to
parties whose property was being seized for taxes not assessed
against them, as where property was owned by a company as a
partnership and the taxes were assessed against the company as
56
a corporation.
Section 3224 R. S. applies to taxpayers only, who, thus deprived of one remedy are given another remedy by Section 3226
R. S., as amended, an action to recover after taxes are paid and
repayment denied by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Nor
are they limited to the statutory remedy, but, after the taxes are
paid, they may have trespass or other action against the collector. 57
This section is not applicable to non-taxpayers, and does not
prevent the granting of an injunction against a collector from
selling the property of a non-taxpayer in order to satisfy the
demands made upon a taxpayer. 58 Such a suit is not one
against the TTnited States, but is one against an individual who,
as an officer iL the discharge of a discretionless ministerial duty,
is committing acts of trespass illegally. !9 Congress has no
power to grant, and has not assumed to grant, authority to collectors of internal reveiue to distrain the property of one person to pay the taxes of another, although it is suggested that
p rhaps it could, were the property in the possession of the tax0
payer S
Receiver and Trustees. Section 3224 R S. does not prohibit
receivers, as officers of the court, applying to the court appointing them for instructions as to payment of taxes claimed by the
government where they contend that the property or the income
from property in their charge is not subject to the taxes claimed.
"Markle v. Kirkendall, supra in Note A
RSee Note sS.
" Long v. Rasmussen, (D. C., Mont., i9n) 281 Fed. 236, and cases
therein cited.
, See Note 57.
"See Note s7.
' Long v. Rasmussen, supra in Note 57; Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich.
251

(s858).
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In the case where the receivers took this action, they were ordered not to pay any income tax. This was on the theory
that the funds were in the hands of the court, the receivers being officers of the court, and the court, therefore, did not exceed

its jurisdiction in making the order complained of in view of

Section 3224 of the Revised Statutes. 61 But, upon an application for instructions, a state court refused to assume jurisdiction
of federal tax questions raised6 2 and held that trustees liquidating and dissolving a corporation as provided by Sections 23447
and z3448 of the Connecticut Statutes are not officers of.the
court. 63 In another case a trustee was enjoined from voluntarily complying with an order of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
to pay additional tax. o
Suit by Stockholder to Restrain Corporationfrom Paying
Illegal Tax. While'purely injunctional bills cannot he sustained
to restrain the collection of taxes upon the sole ground of their
unconstitutionality, 65 in cases where a speedy determination of
the constitutionality of the tax is desirable a method has -frequently been adopted of determining in advance the validity of
the tax, which would not be available in the case-of an individual
taxpayer. This is at most a justifiable evasion of the statute. It
is well settled that courts of equity have jurisdiction to prevent a
threatened breach of trust in the misapplication or diversion of
the funds of a corporation for illegal payments out of its capital or profits. By virtue of this power a court of"equity will
take jurisdiction of a bill by a stockholder alleging that an illegal tax has been assessed against the corporation, and that the
officers of the corporation have refused to take the necessary
steps to resist the collection of the tax. In such a suit, the
validity of the tax will be in issue and will be determined by the
"Scott v. Western Pacific R. Co., (C. C. A., Ninth Cir., 1917) 246 Fed.

S4S. aApplication

of Willmann et aL., Trustees, 96 Conn. 73 (925)
'Willmann v. Walsh, 96 Cgn. 79 (592).
"Weeks v. Sibley, (D. C., N. D., Texas, i920) 269 Fed. ig.
'Shelton v. Platt, 139 U. S. 591 (x89x); Allen v. Pullman's Palace Car
Co., x39 U. S. 658 (8gi), and case cited in Note 43.
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court, although the government or agency on behalf of which
the tax was assessed, or its officers, are not a party to the proceeding. 66 The object of the suit is to restrain the corporation
from voluntarily paying the tax. It has been held that such a
suit is not prohibited by Section 3224 of the Revised Statutes. 87
The right of a stockholder to maintain such a suit was,
however, denied in the cases of Straus v. Abrast Realty Co. 61
and Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co.6 9 It is to be noted that in
the Stanton case the injunction was denied even though the unconstitutionality of the tax was alleged. This case was decided
about one month after the Brushaber case and the opinion of the
court in the Stanton case expressly refers to the Brushaber case
and states that all the objections of unconstitutionality raised in
the Stanton case were disposed of in the Brushaber case. The
court having granted the injunction in the Brushabcr case and
denied it in the Stanton case, would indicate that the constitutionality of a law once having been decided, further suits alleging the unconstitutionality of that law would not give rise to
injunctive relief from the assessment and collection of taxes
under it, even when brought by a stockholder to restrain the
corporation from voluntarily complying with the demands of the
collector.
While at first the jurisdiction of the courts over such bills
for injunction was sustained, in part at least, on the ground that
objection to the jurisdiction had not been seasonably raised, it
now appears to be the rule that a case of equity jurisdiction is
established in such cases, on account of the confusion, wrong,
multiplicity of suits, and absence of all means of redress which
would result if the corporation paid the tax without protest. 70
In such cases it is now usual for the defendant corporation to
call the attention of the government to the pendency of the
"Dodge v. Woolsey, i8 How. 33i (x856).
TPollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429 (1895); Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., 24o U. S. i (19t6).
(D. C., E. D., N. Y., 1912) 200 Fed. 327.
240 U. S. 1o3 (igi6).
,Brusbaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., supra in Note 67.
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suit and the nature of the controversy and its unwillingness
voluntarily to refuse to comply with the act assailed.
Mr. Chief Justice Fuller in his opinion in the case of Pollock v. Farmers'Loan and Trust Company, at pages 553 and 554,
said:
"The jurisdiction of a court of equity to prevent any breach
of trust -in the misapplication or diversion of the funds of a
corporation by illegal payment out of its capital or profits has
been frequently sustained. Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U. S. (18
How.) 331; Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U. S. 450.
"As in Dodge v. Woolsey, this bill proceeds on the ground
that the defendants would be guilty of such breach of trust or
duty in voluntarily making returns for the imposition of, and
paying, an unconstitutional tax; and also an allegation of threatened multiplicity of suits and irreparable injury."
In his opinion in the case of Brushaber v. Union .Pacific
Railway Company, Mr. Chief Justice White, at page 9, said:
"The right to prevent the corporation from returning and
paying the tax was based upon many averments as to the repugnancy of the statute to the Constitution of the United States, of
the peculiar relation of the corporation to the stockholders, and
their particular interests resulting from many of the administrative provisions of the assailed act, of the confusion, wrong, and
multiplicity of suits, and the absence of all means of redress
which would result if the corporation paid the tax and complied
with the Act in other respects without protest, as it was alleged
it was its intention to do. To put out of the way a question of
jurisdiction we at once say that in view of these averments and
the ruling in Pollock v. Farmers'Loan and Trust Company, 157
U. 0. 429, 39 L. Ed. 759, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 673, sustaining the
right of a stockholder to sue to restrain a corporation under
proper averments from voluntarily paying a tax charged to be
unconstitutional on the ground that to permit such a suit did not
violate the prohibitions of Section 3224, Revised Statutes (Comp.
Stat. 1913, Section 5947). against enjoining the enfor.-nent
of taxes, we are of the opinion that the contention here ma.- that
there was no jurisdiction of the cause, since to entertain it would
violate the provisions of the Revised Statutes referred to, is without merit." (Italics mine.)
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In the Straus case the court, in denying the injunction, said:
"The complainant seeks to do the very thing that the law
prohibits. If the stockholder cannot have the collector of the
tax enjoined, it seems obvious that he cannot have the corporation enjoined from paying it, and thus do by indirection what he
cannot do directly. To restrain a corporation or its officers from
paying a tax, the collection of which cannot be restrained in any
court, would be a palpable evasion of the statute."
Assessmets Made Under Title II, Section 35 of the National Prohibition Act, and Other Liquor Laws. It has been
held that the provisions of Section 3224 R. S. are not applicale
to assessments levied under Title II, Section 35 of the National
Prohibition Act (41 Stat. L. 3o5), 7' because the assessments authorized by this Act are penalties and not taxes. 72 In Fontenot
v. Accardo, 73 the court said:
"We are of the opinion that the assessments involved- in
these cases were assessments of penalties and are not collectible
by distraint proceedings."
In Kelly v. Lewellyn, 74 the court, after citing Accardo v.
Fontenot,71 said:
"I am satisfied that Congress has not placed in the hands of
the collector of internal revenue the power to collect by distress
and sale, the penalties provided for in the said section of the National Prohibition Act. This same question has been before
"Fontenot v. Accardo, (C. C. A., Fifth Cir., x92) 278 Fed. 811; Connolly v. Gardner, (D. C., E. D., N. Y., ix2) 272 Fed. 9x; Kausch v.
Moore, (D. C., E. D., Mo, E. D, 92o) 268 Fed. 668; Kelly v. Lewellyn,
(D. C., W. D., Pa., 1921) 274 Fed. nz; Ledbetter v. Bailey, (D. C., %V.D.,
N. C., 1921) 274 Fed. 375; Middleton v. Mee, (D. C., S. Dak., ig2) 277
Fed. 492; Thome v. Lynch, (D. C., Minn., Third Div., i92!) 269 Fed. 995;
(1922); Regal Drug Corp. v. Wardell, 260
Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U. S. U. S. (1g2).
" For the distinction between "taxes" and "penalties" see: New Jersey v.
Anderson, 203 U. S. 483, 492 (igo6); Houck v. Little River District, :*9 U.

S. 254 (Igxi): Helwig v. United States, 188 U. S. 6o5 (9o3); Lipke v.
Lederer, supra inNote 21.
0 (C. C. A., Fifth Cir., 922) 278 Fed. 87T.
"(D. J, W. D, Pa, z92) 274 Fed. 112.
-269 Fed. '447, affirmed in (C. C. A., Fifth Cir.,

922) 278 Fed.

334

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

courts in other jurisdictions and decided in favor of the plaintiff where similar bills have been filed."
In Ledbetter v. Bailey '6 the court, in holding that the provisions of Section 3224 R. S. did not apply, even as to the
double tax provided in the National Prohibition Act, said:
"The conclusions of the court are, therefore, that under
the provisions of Section 35 of the Volstead Act taxes cannot
be assessed or collected; that the double tax provided in the Act,
and the penalties prescribed, are nothing more nor less than punishment for the commission of criminal offenses; that these
penalties must be collected by civil actions or pronounced as judgments in criminal caies; that the provisions of Section 3224 do
not apply and that these suits are not forbidden thereby; that the
court has jurisdiction to entertain the suits and issue the orders
of restraint or decrees for injunction sought thereby."
In L'pke v. Lederer,7 7 -the Supreme Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice McReynolds, said:
"The mere use of the word 'tax' in an act primarily designed
to define and suppress crime is not enough to show that within
the true intendment of the term, a tax was laid, Bailey v. Drexel
Furniture Co. (May 15, 1922). When by its very nature the
imposition is a penalty, it must be so regarded. Helaiw v.
United States, 188 U. S. 6o5, 613. Evidence of crime (Section
29) is essential to assessment under Section 35. It lacks all the
ordinary characteristics of a tax, whose primary function 'is to
provide for the support of the Government,' and dearly involves
the idea of punishment for infraction of the law,-the definite
function of a penalty.
"Section 35 prescribes no definite mode for enforcing the
imposition which it directs, and if it be interpreted as above stated,
we do not understand counsel for the United States claim that
relief should be denied to the appellant. Before collection of
taxes levied by statutes enacted in plain pursuance of the taxing
power can be enfdrced, the taxpayer- must be given fair opportunity for hearing,-this is essential to due process of law,
Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Wright, 207 U. S. 127, 136, 138,
(D. C, W. D., N. C., r92i) 274 Fed. 375.
"259 U. S. (x922).
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142,-and certainly we cannot conclude, in the absence of language admitting of no other construction, that Congress intended that penalties for crime should be endorsed through the
secret findings and summary action of executive officers. The
guarantees of due process of law and trial by iurv are not to be
forgotten or disregarded.
"The collector demanded payment of a penalty, and Section 3224, which prohibits suits to restrain assessment or collection of any tax, is without application. And the same is true as
to statutes granting the right to sue for taxes paid under protest."

In MiddIcton v. M'ee Ts the court said:
"I believe, however, that a defendant, charged with a violation of this statute, should have his day in court, and an interpretation of this statute that closes to him forever tle hope of financial progress, by placing this lien against him, is to imply an intent and purpose on the part of Congress, inconsistent with the
intent and purpose of the act. I am, therefore, of the opinion
that such of these provisions of the Volstead Act as may be
enforced against violators of that law are penalties, and not
taxes; that such penalties cannot be assessed by an internal revenue collector, without giving the person charged his day in
court. Finally, the procedure by distraint for the collection of
these penalties, as threatened in these cases, cannot be sanctioned. There has been no adjudication in court as to the liability of the plaintiffs. This liability is denied. There has been
no hearing. Distraint under such circumstances is not due process of law."

In Regal Drug Corporation v. Wardell, " the Supreme
Court, basing its decision on Lipke v. Lederer, held that Section
3224 R. S. has no application to the tax imposed under Section
35 of the National Prohibition Act, because the assessment there
levied is a penalty and not a tax. The court said:
"The distinction between a tax and a penalty was emphasized. The function of a tax, it was said, 'is to provide for the
support of the government;' the function of a penalty clearly in(D. C., S. Dak., S. D., t92r)
"26o U. S. (1922).

277 Fed. 492.
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volves the 'idea of punishment for infringement of the law;' and
that a condition of its imposition is notice and hearing. O'SulIvan v. Felix, 233 U. S. 318, 324, 58 L. ed. 980, 982, 34 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 596. And even if the imposition may be considered a
tax, if it have punitive purpse, it must be preceded by opportunity to contest its validity. Central of Georgia R. Co. v.
Wright, 207 U. S. 127, 52 L. ed. 134, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 47, 12
Ann. Cas. 463."
. The court, in Thomne v. Lynch, 10 made the following statement:
I".... I have reached the conclusion that all of the exactions provided in Section 35, whether called taxes or penalties, so
far as they apply to the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquor
for beverage purposes, stand on the same footing and have the
same essential ,character. Also, and in view of the foregoing
considerations, it appears more reasonable to hold that all of
said exactions in Section 35, so far as they apply to the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes, are
penalties, rather than taxes. To hold these exactions to be taxes,
aind collectible by distraint, would, in the instant cases, be to
hold that searches and seizures may be made in private residences upon suspicion, without warrant; that these plaintiffs
may be comelled to give evidence against themselves as to the
commission of a criminal offense; that they may be punished for
alleged violation of law without having had a day in court; that
they may be deprived by administrative officers of a jury trial for
an alleged criminal offense. Such results as these I do not believe were intended by Congress.
"Title 2, Section 28, of the National Prohibition Act, confers on the Internal Revenue Commissioner and subordinate officers, for the enforcement of the National Prohibition Act, the
powers which are conferred by law for the enforcement of existing laws relating to the manufacture and sale of intoxicating
liquors.
Those powers include the enforcement by distraint in cases of special taxes and certain penalties annexed to
them under the internal revenue laws. But if, as we have seen,
the exactions under Section 35 of the National Prohibition Act
are none of them taxes, but all of them penalties, so far as they
relate to the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes, then it follows that 'Section 28 gives no power
, (D. C., Minn., Third Div,

192i)

269 Fed. 995.
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Finally, the pro...
to collect these penalties by distraint .
cedure by distraint for the collection of penalties, as is now
threatened in the present case, is open to grave constitutional
objections. As already noted, there has been no adjudication
in court as to the liability of the plaintiff; the liability is denied;
there has been no hearing. In many of the cases alleged evidence
has been obtained by illegal searches and seizures. Procedure by
distraint under such circumstances would not be due process
of law.
"If the foregoing conclusion as to the nature of the exactions be correct, then Section 3224 is not a bar to the relief
sought. And for the same reasons the remedies provided in
Sections 3225 and 3226, R. S. (Comp. St. Secs. 5948, 5949), have
no application to the instant cases. Nor is it an adequate remedy
at law for the plaintiffs to pay the exactions demanded, and sue
for recovery. In some cases it is alleged that it is impossible for
plaintiffs to pay the amounts demanded, sums runhing as high
as $6500, and that seizure and sale would ruin plaintiff's business
and means of livelihood. The equities in favor of the plaintiffs
are strong and persuasive."
In Wassel v. Lederer, 81 it was held that a federal trial
court should not make a finding that an exaction called by Congress a tax is in fact a penalty, the enforcement of which may
be enjoined under appropriate circumstances; but the duty of
making such a finding should be left to a court of final jurisdiction. In that case, the court said:
"Congress has called the payment imposed a. tax, and -has
directed it to be levied and collected as such. It is, as we view it,
beyond the province of a trial court to make the finding that
Congress is not exercising the power which it declares itself to
be exercising, but another power which it does not lawfully possess.

.

.

.

The view we take, however, is that it is the or-

derly and preferred mode of judicial procedure to leave to a
court of final jurisdiction the duty and responsibility of finding
the facts upon which- the distinction made rests."
It is to be noted, however, that the Supreme Court made the
finding which this court refused to make. 82
(D. C., E. D., Pa., 921) 274 Fed. 480.
"ULipke v. Lederer, supra in- Note 21.
I
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Some courts have taken a different view of the assessments
levied under Title II, Section 35, of the National Prohibition Act
and have refused to restrain the collection of these assessments. 83 However, all these cases except Violette v. Walsh, were
decided prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case
of Lipke v. Lederer.
The case of Violette v. Walsh, holding that Section 3224 R.
S. prevents the granting of an injunction to restrain the tax imposed by Section 3251 R. S. on the manufacture of distilled
spirits, even though said section has been repealed by the National Prohibition Act, may be distinguished from the other cases
on the ground that in that case the taxpayer had been convicted
and there was no question but that he was subject to the taxes
and penalties sought to be collected.
Before an injunction- will be granted restraining the collection of a penalty by distraint, all lawful taxes must be first paid
or tendered, 84 even where the amount of the tax is doubled upon.
the contingency of a violation of the law. 85
Where an injunction is sought to restrain collection of "penalties," failure to aver that "taxes" alleged to be due have been
paid- is cause for dismissal of the bill. 86 After denying an injunction as to taxes and penalties because the plaintiff had not
averred that lie had paid the taxes assessed against him in double
the amount, under the Act, the court granted the injunction
prayed in a subsequent bill, where such averment was made. 8?
It has been held that while the prohibition of suits to enjoin
the collection of internal revenue taxes does not specifically include penalties, as such, yet, where these penalties are authorized
by the statute to be added to the tax and collected as a part of
" Kohlhammer v. Smietanka, supra in Note 18; Pummilli v. Riordan,
supra in Note 22; Violette v. Walsh, (C. C. A., Ninth Cir., i922) 282 Fed.
582; Wassel v. Lederer, supra in Note 22.
"Kausch v. Moore, and Fontenot v. Accardo, supra in Note 21; Kelly
v. Lewellyn, supra in Note 23.
' Kausch v. Moore, supra in Note 2t; Kelly v. Lewellyn, supra in Note
23.

, Fontenot v. Accardo, supra in Note 21; Kohlhammer v. Smietanka,
supra in Note 1S.
"Kelly v. Lewellyn, supra in Note 23.
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the tax, the penalty is a part of the tax and its collection cannot
be enjoined, I" although this is probably not now the law in
view of the Supreme Court decisions in Lipke v. Lederer and
Regal Drug Corp. v. Warddl.
CONCLUSION.
It may, therefore, be said that Section 3224 R. S. prohibits
the granting of an injunction restraining the collection of federal taxes unless its provisions .are rendered inapplicable to a
particular case because of extraordiary and exceptional circumstances. These cases have been limited to situations where the
taxpayer has no adequate remedy at law to recover back the
taxes paid, if illegally assessed and collected; to cases where to
sue and recover back the taxes would necessitate a multiplicity of
suits which would be impracticable; to cases where the action
of the collector is a nullity, the property about to be seized not
being liable for the assessment; and to cases where the collector
is selling the property of a non-taxpayer to satisfy the demands
made upon a taxpayer. This section does not prevent the granting of an injunction to restrain the collection of a penalty if the
taxes claimed to be due are paid, nor the maintaining by a stockholder of a corporation of a suit to restrain the corporation from
voluntarily paying a tax alleged to be unconstitutional if the constitutionality of such tax has not been adjudicated. Nor does it
prohibit a receiver appointed by a federal court from requesting
instructions as to the payment of a tax.
Clarence A. Miller.
Washington, D.. C.
"Kohhammer v. Smietanka, supra in Note'iS..

